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Abstract
Facing a large set of alternatives has previously been reported to lead to choice
overload, including choice deferral. Recent studies, however, imply that choice deferral is
more tightly associated with the difficulty in evaluating alternatives than with set size:
when alternatives are difficult to evaluate, people often defer a choice. This implication is
examined in the present study, using alternatives with probabilistic pay-offs in two
paradigms: the description paradigm — with full probability and pay-off information
provided at one time — and the sampling paradigm — with search revealing one pay-off at
a time and repeated search required to derive probabilities and pay-offs. The results show
that in both paradigms, choice deferral is less frequent when set size is large. Also, the
difficulty in evaluating alternatives influences choice deferral in the description paradigm
but not in the sampling paradigm: when a pay-off from an alternative can take many
possible values, a choice is more likely deferred in the description paradigm. In the
sampling paradigm, in contrast, information search is often insufficient for people to
recognize the difficulty in evaluating alternatives. These results point to a
description-experience gap in choice deferral.
Keywords: too much choice effect; choice overload; overchoice effect; tyranny of
choice; information overload; choice deferral; choice set size; assortment size; risky choice;
decision making
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Description-experience gap in choice deferral
When making a choice, people often face a large set of alternatives to choose from.
For example, one on-line retailer, amazon.com, now offers more than 3,000 jams. While it
may be more likely for people to find a preferred jam in a large set than in a small set,
some previous studies report that with more alternatives people are more likely to defer a
choice (e.g., Iyengar, Huberman, & Jiang, 2004). Broadly, this effect is known as choice
overload1. The existence of choice overload, however, is disputed, and its boundary
conditions are a source of ongoing research (e.g., Greifeneder, Scheibehenne, & Kleber,
2010; Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, & Todd, 2010). In the present study, we investigate
choice deferral in risky choice environments and demonstrate that factors contributing to
choice deferral can vary depending on how information is presented.
Choice overload and choice deferral
Choice overload is typically associated with three types of behaviors: the first of these
is reduced choice quality. When faced with a large set, people often show a reduced
capacity to choose the most preferred alternative (Malhotra, 1982; Scammon, 1977). For
example, Malhotra (1982) reported that people are less likely to choose the product best
aligned with their individual preferences, when making a choice between 25 products,
compared to when making a choice between 5 products. Second, perhaps as a consequence
of reduced choice quality, people tend to show decreased satisfaction with their choices
(Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). Third, and most relevant to the present study, people are more
likely to defer a choice when confronted with a large choice set (Iyengar et al., 2004).
Choice set size as a determinant of choice deferral has, however, come under
increasing scrutiny. A recent meta-analysis found that set size has a “virtually zero” effect
size on decreased satisfaction and choice deferral (Scheibehenne et al., 2010). Scheibehenne
1Choice overload is a synonym for too-much-choice and other terms including choice paralysis, paradox
of choice, and the tyranny of choice.
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et al. (2010) suggest that in some cases choice overload was potentially reliable, but that
“to understand the effect that assortment size can have on choice, it will be essential to
consider the interaction between the broader context of the structure of assortments —
beyond the mere number of options available — and the decision processes that people
adopt” (p. 421).
One factor that has since been investigated is the number of attributes (or features)
associated with each alternative. Greifeneder et al. (2010) demonstrate that a growth in set
size alone does not decrease satisfaction, but that increasing the number of attributes along
which an alternative is described does. The number of attributes has also been shown to
affect choice quality (Helgeson & Ursic, 1993) and choice deferral (Dhar, 1997). Dhar
(1997), for example, presented participants with two consumer products (e.g., jams) at one
time and asked them to make a choice. The results suggest that people are more likely to
defer a choice when two products differ in four attributes rather than two attributes.
Crucially, alternatives become more difficult to evaluate as the number of attributes
increases. Thus the findings from the previous studies indicate that people are more likely
to defer a choice when alternatives are more difficult to evaluate. In the present study,
implications of the difficulty in evaluating alternatives is examined using risky choice
environments.
Risky choice
Studies with risky choice environments ask people to make choices between
alternatives that deliver monetary pay-offs with a fixed probability. For instance, an
alternative can be associated with a 10% probability of £3 and a 90% probability of £0.
Risky choice has been studied with two separate, yet related, paradigms: the description
paradigm and the sampling paradigm. In the description paradigm, pay-off and probability
information are explicitly provided at one point in time.
In contrast, in the sampling paradigm, people typically learn about pay-offs by
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sampling pay-offs one-at-a-time over a series of samples. A sequence of samples from the
alternative with a 10% probability of £3 and a 90% probability of £0, for example, could
reveal £3, £0, and £0. In this sampling paradigm, people can sample each alternative as
much as they like before making a choice. Thus, in both description and sampling
paradigms, people make choices between alternatives with probabilistic pay-offs, and
choices are influenced by the information people gather.
In these risky choice environments, choice deferral can potentially be induced with an
increment in the number of possible pay-offs (i.e., branches). One branch corresponds to
one possible pay-off and its associated probability. In the above example, the alternative
has two possible pay-offs (i.e., £3 and £0) and hence has two branches.
The number of branches has been reported to influence choices in the description
paradigm: when set size is large, an alternative with fewer branches is more often chosen,
compared to when set size is small (Iyengar & Kamenica, 2010). This avoidance of
alternatives with many branches implies a preference for alternatives that are easier to
evaluate. Thus when faced with a choice between alternatives with many branches, people
may avoid evaluating alternatives altogether and simply defer a choice. This explanation of
choice deferral makes specific hypotheses for the sampling paradigm.
In the sampling paradigm, the number of branches in an alternative is only revealed
by sampling. However, people often do not draw enough samples to realize exact
probabilities of pay-off in two-branch alternatives (Fox & Hadar, 2006; Ungemach, Chater,
& Stewart, 2009). Thus, people may also be unlikely to draw sufficient samples to
recognize the number of branches per alternative. Although research has suggested that
people draw more samples from alternatives with higher complexity in pay-offs (Lejarraga,
Hertwig, & Gonzalez, 2012), we do not expect the number of samples to scale sufficiently
with the number of branches for people to realize that an alternative has multiple
branches. Moreover in previous study, we found that people sampled less per alternative in
a larger set (Hills, Noguchi, & Gibbert, 2013; Noguchi & Hills, 2015), which may make it
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less likely for people to realize the number of branches. Thus, we predict that an increase
in the number of branches will influence choice deferral more readily in the description
paradigm than in the sampling paradigm.
In the sampling paradigm, we hypothesize that an increase in the number of
alternatives — a growth in set size — will reduce the frequency of choice deferral. This is a
consequence of the statistical distribution of pay-offs over many alternatives: when
multiple alternatives are sampled, it is likely that at least one of the alternatives deliver a
large pay-off at a higher frequency than its underling probability (Noguchi & Hills, 2015).
As a result, a few alternatives in a large set will appear much better than the others,
making the alternative appear easier to evaluate.
In summary, we predict that a growth in set size is likely to reduce the frequency of
choice deferral in the sampling paradigm. Also, an increment in the number of branches is
more likely to increase the frequency of choice deferral in the description paradigm than in
the sampling paradigm.
Method
In this section, we report how we determined sample size, all data exclusions (if any),
all manipulations, and all measures in the study.
Participants
Seventy-two (63 females, 8 males, and 1 undisclosed) undergraduate students
participated in the study. Prior to collecting the data, we decided to recruit all available
students (n = 88) who were offered the chance to participate in an experiment for a course
credit at the University of Warwick. Out of the 88, 16 students did not participate. The
students’ age ranged from 18 to 33, with a mean of 19.1.
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Design
The experiment employed a 2 (between-participants, set size: small or large) × 2
(between-participants, paradigm: description or sampling) × 2 (within-participant, branch:
two or four) design. Participants were randomly assigned to each of the
between-participant conditions.
Apparatus
Alternatives were independently and randomly generated for each trial for each
participant with the following procedure. First, an expected pay-off was determined with a
random draw from a normal distribution whose mean was 1.00 with standard deviation
0.30. This normal distribution was truncated to ensure that no alternative was assigned to
a negative expected pay-off. In generating an alternative with four branches, for example, a
random draw from the normal distribution might be 1.20. This 1.20 is treated as the
expected pay-off for this alternative.
The expected pay-off was then randomly divided into two (two branch condition) or
four (four branch condition) pay-offs, with a constraint that one of the branches was
assigned to 0.00. This division was conducted by multiplying the expected value with
multinomial probabilities randomly drawn from Dirichlet distribution whose concentration
parameters were all 1.00. Continuing the above example, 1.20 is randomly divided into four
numbers: for instance, 0.62, 0.41, 0.17, and 0.00.
Then, the probability of each pay-off within a alternative was independently
determined with a random draw from another Dirichlet distribution whose concentration
parameters were all 1.00. For example, independently drawn random numbers from a
Dirichlet distribution may be .34, .13, .08, and .45.
Finally, the expected pay-offs were divided by the probability of pay-off to derive the
pay-off amount for each branch. Continuing the above example, the alternative is
associated with a .34 probability of 1.82 (= 0.62/0.34), a .13 probability of 3.15
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(= 0.41/0.13), a .08 probability of 2.13 (= 0.17/0.08), and a .45 probability of 0.00.
The probability and the amount of pay-off are both rounded to the nearest two
decimals, and each alternative for the same trial was independently generated with the
same procedure.
Procedure
Participants were instructed that their payments would depend on their choices
during the experiment. The experiment asked participants to make 10 choices in total, 5 of
which were choices between alternatives with two branches and the other 5 were choices
between four branches. The five two-branch trials and the five four-branch trials were
randomly interleaved for each participant.
Each trial displayed 2 alternatives (small set size) or 35 alternatives (large set size) as
an array of boxes on a screen. Example screen-shots are provided in Figure 1. The set size
of 2 and 35 alternatives are reported to induce changes in search behavior and subsequent
choices in Hills et al. (2013) and Noguchi and Hills (2015). Participants were asked to
sample the alternatives as many times as they wanted and then decide whether to choose
an alternative to purchase for £1.00 or to defer a choice and keep £1.00.
Every time an alternative was sampled, information about the alternative was
presented for 1,000ms. In the description paradigm, the information displayed the
probability and pay-off amount (e.g., 55%, £2.19). In the sampling paradigm, the
information presented was a random draw with replacement from the pay-off distribution
associated with that alternative. For example, when an alternative with a 55% probability
of £2.19 was sampled in the sampling paradigm, about 55 in 100 samples on average
displayed £2.19, otherwise £0.00. After sampling, if participants decided to purchase an
alternative, participants were then asked to indicate the alternative whose draw they
wished to purchase.
Previous studies with the description paradigm, however, typically presents
CHOICE DEFERRAL 9
information on alternatives without requiring mouse clicks (e.g., Hertwig, Barron, Weber,
& Erev, 2004). Unlike previous studies, the present study uses the click-based procedure
for both paradigms for two reasons. First, the present design reduces the influence of
differences in search costs. If the description paradigm presents information without
requiring clicks, the search costs will be lower than in the sampling paradigm, where each
alternative needs to be clicked. Second, the click-based procedure allows us to explore
information search patterns. However, even with the click-based procedure in the
description paradigm, participants had to click an alternative only once to gain information
on all the possible pay-offs and the associated probabilities.
Participants did not learn about the pay-offs from their purchases until the end of the
experiment, when one of the 10 trials was randomly selected. If a participant purchased a
draw in the randomly selected trial, the participant was paid the pay-off they earned from
the purchase. If the participant did not purchase a draw in the randomly selected trial, the
participant was paid £1.00. The payment ranged from £0.00 to £2.39, and its mean was
£0.61.
Results
Figure 2 presents the proportion of choice purchase as a function of paradigm
(description or sampling), set size (small or large) and branches (two or four). Figure 2
shows that the proportion of choice purchase increases with a growth in set size in both
paradigms — choice deferral decreased with a growth in set size. Moreover, an increment
in the number of branches reduced the proportion of choice purchase, but only in the
description paradigm. In the description condition, choices are most likely to be purchased
when a set size is large and the number of branches is few. In the sampling paradigm,
however, the number of branches does not appear to influence choice purchase. Thus, the
results indicate that choice overload is least likely in a large set with easy-to-evaluate
alternatives.
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Mixed-effect logistic regressions2 suggest a significant effect of set size on choice
purchase: χ2(1) = 10.12, β = 0.86, p < .01, ∆AIC = 8.12. In addition, an interaction effect
indicates that an effect of branch significantly depends on paradigm: χ2(1) = 11.48,
β = 1.32, p < .001, ∆AIC = 9.48. In the description paradigm, choice is significantly less
likely to be purchased in the four branch condition than in the two branch condition:
χ2(1) = 14.82, β = −1.33, p < .001, ∆AIC = 12.82. In the sampling paradigm, branch has
a non-significant effect: χ2(1) = 0.17, β = 0.10, p = .68, ∆AIC = 1.83. The other
interaction and main effects are non-significant: ps > .28.
In previous studies, we found that larger set sizes increase the likelihood that people
encounter large pay-offs in the sampling paradigm (Hills et al., 2013; Noguchi & Hills,
2015). We also found this result in the present experiment: the maximum amount of
pay-off which participant saw while sampling alternatives tends to be greater in the large
sets than in the small sets: χ2(1) = 30.76, β = 1.81, p < .001, ∆AIC = 28.76. In addition,
this maximum sample pay-off is a significant predictor of choice purchase: a choice is more
likely to be purchased when the maximum sample pay-off is larger (χ2(1) = 28.68,
β = 1.44, p < .001, ∆AIC = 26.74). This effect of the maximum sample pay-off does not
significantly differ between the large and the small sets or between the two and the four
branch conditions: ps > .07. Thus, the increased frequency of choice purchase in the large
sets is likely due to the differences in the maximum sample pay-offs people see.
We also examined the counter-part effects in the description paradigm: whether
choice purchase is predicted by the maximum expected pay-off participants saw. The
maximum expected pay-off within a trial was larger in the large sets than in the small sets:
χ2(1) = 55.22, β = 0.25, p < .001, ∆AIC = 53.22 — which is a consequence of the pay-off
design, with each expected pay-off chosen from the normal distribution. However, this
maximum expected pay-off did not significantly predict choice purchase: χ2(1) = 3.69,
2All the mixed-effect regressions we report here include maximal random factors: by-participant intercept
and slopes. We assess statistical significance by examining model fit with chi-square tests.
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β = 1.35, p = .055, ∆AIC = 1.69. This effect of the maximum expected pay-off does not
significantly differ between the large and the small sets or between the two and the four
branch conditions: ps > .80. Thus, the increased frequency of choice purchase is not likely
due to the differences in the maximum expected pay-offs people see.
Sampling pattern
Our experimental design allows us to explore patterns of information search in both
description and sampling paradigms. As we did not have specific hypotheses to test, we
only describe the patterns with 95% confidence intervals below.
Figure 3 shows the mean numbers of samples per alternative. In the description
paradigm (the left panel in Figure 3), participants tend to sample more in the four branch
than in the two branch condition. The numbers of samples per alternative, however,
decreases for both branch conditions with a growth in set size.
In the sampling paradigm, in contrast, the differences between the two and the four
branch conditions appear small. The small differences indicate that participants might
have not noticed that alternatives in the four branch condition are associated with the
large number of possible pay-offs than alternatives in the two branch condition. Indeed in
the sampling paradigm, the number of possible pay-offs participants saw in one alternative
is typically below two in both branch conditions: the means are 1.13 (95% CI [1.07, 1.20])
and 1.28 (95% CI [1.15, 1.42]) for the two and the four branch conditions in the small sets,
and 1.02 (95% CI [1.01, 1.04]) and 1.05 (95% CI [1.03, 1.07]) for the two and the four
branch conditions in the large sets. These sampling patterns highlight that the number of
branches is not readily apparent to participants in the sampling paradigm, leading to
similar proportions of choice deferral in both branch conditions.
In addition, Figure 4 illustrates the mean number of alternatives sampled in a large
set. Here, the error bars largely overlap, indicating that the differences between the
paradigms is small.
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Lastly, we note that the mean number of samples per alternative and the number of
alternatives sampled do not significantly predict choice purchase in the large sets:
χ2(1) = 0.24, β = 0.01, p = .62, ∆AIC = 1.76; and χ2(1) = 3.64, β = 0.98, p = .06,
∆AIC = 1.64, respectively. These effects do not differ between the paradigms or the
branch conditions: ps > .09.
Discussion
Previous studies on choice overload have suggested that a growth in set size reduces
choice quality, decreases satisfaction, and increases the frequency of choice deferral. These
effects were initially attributed to large set sizes, but empirical evidence suggest that the
picture is more subtle. In the present study, we found that choice deferral is mediated by
set size, number of possible pay-offs, and presentation format.
First, our results indicate that choice deferral is less frequent in a large set for both
description and sampling paradigms. This less frequent deferral shows that a growth in set
size alone does not necessarily lead to choice deferral.
For the description paradigm, this result is consistent with previous studies
suggesting that people are more likely to find an alternative they prefer in a large set than
in a small set, if they have sufficiently well-defined preferences (Chernev, 2003;
Scheibehenne et al., 2010). These studies indicate that participants in the present study
may have preferences for alternatives with certain quality (e.g., a high probability of
pay-off), which are more readily found in a large set. In this vein, previous research
(Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 2003) has shown that in a large set, people are likely to
consider only a subset of information, and thus in the present study, participants’
preferences might have been based on a subset of branches in a large set. These
non-compensatory preferences potentially explain why overall quality of alternatives (i.e.,
expected pay-off) is only a non-significant predictor of choice deferral.
In the sampling paradigm, in contrast, the less frequent deferral is due to the
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increased likelihood of encountering large pay-offs in a large set. Previously, we saw that
this increased likelihood biases choices towards alternatives with rare large pay-offs (Hills
et al., 2013; Noguchi & Hills, 2015). The present results further indicate that this bias in
choice is not a result of forced choice — people appear to develop preferences for
alternatives with large pay-offs sufficiently enough to purchase an alternative.
Second, we found that choice deferral is associated with the number of possible
pay-offs. As the number of pay-offs increases, alternatives become more difficult to
evaluate. This increased difficulty has been shown to lead people to make a choice which is
easier to evaluate (Iyengar & Kamenica, 2010), or to simplify information to ease
evaluation (Lejarraga, 2010). The present results demonstrate that the increased difficulty
leads to choice deferral in the description paradigm, but not in the sampling paradigm. In
the sampling paradigm, information search tends to be insufficient for people to recognize
the number of possible pay-offs. The insufficient search is one of the major factors which
contribute to the description-experience gap in risk-taking (Hertwig et al., 2004; Ungemach
et al., 2009), but in the present study, we show that the insufficient search also contributes
to the description-experience gap in choice deferral.
To conclude, the present study highlights the concern raised by Scheibehenne et al.
(2010) by suggesting that choice deferral can be a function of interactions between multiple
factors. Here, we investigate and found a relationship between choice deferral and set size,
choice complexity, and information presentation format (i.e., the description or sampling
paradigm).
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Click and sample a pay-off.
Spend £1.00 and
Buy one draw
Forgo this round and
Keep £1.00
55%, £2.19
(a) Small Set
Click and sample a pay-off.
Spend £1.00 and
Buy one draw
Forgo this round and
Keep £1.00
(b) Large Set
34%, £1.82
13%, £3.15
8%, £2.13
Figure 1 . Example screen-shot for the description paradigm. The left panel illustrates the
screen right after one alternative is clicked in the few branch condition, and the right panel
illustrates the screen in the many branch condition. Font-size is enlarged for illustration
purposes.
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Figure 2 . Proportion of choice purchase. Error bar represents 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3 . Mean number of samples per alternatives. Error bar represents 95% confidence
interval.
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Figure 4 . Mean number of sampled alternatives. Error bar represents 95% confidence
interval.
